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Re: [DNSOP] [dns-operations] dnsop-any-notimp violates the DNS standards

P Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Mon, 16 March 2015 23:16 UTC

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From: P Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 08:15:50 +0900
To: Michael Sinatra <michael@brokendns.net>, bert hubert <bert.hubert@netherlabs.nl>, dnsop@ietf.org, dns-operations@dns-oarc.net
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-operations] dnsop-any-notimp violates the DNS standards
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On March 17, 2015 7:42:09 AM GMT+09:00, Michael Sinatra <michael@brokendns.net> wrote:
>
>
>On 03/16/15 07:23, bert hubert wrote:
>
>> Separately, I fail to see why we actually need to outlaw ANY queries
>when we
>> can happily TC=1 them. 
>
>If the public recursives also support TC=1 on all ANY queries, then
>this
>works.  If not, the issue arises where just-below-the-radar attacks are
>using many public recursives, in which case you're not stopping much.

Michael, what attacks do you think we can stop by limiting ANY? Paul
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