Re: [Extra] Meeting minutes and notes from today

Ned Freed <ned.freed@mrochek.com> Sun, 07 January 2018 20:30 UTC

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Cc: extra@ietf.org, Ned Freed <ned.freed@mrochek.com>
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Date: Sun, 07 Jan 2018 07:33:03 -0800
From: Ned Freed <ned.freed@mrochek.com>
In-reply-to: "Your message dated Thu, 04 Jan 2018 19:07:50 +0100" <POP7FOEK+etgKJuCJ9thXhV0WM4xpgCJwo6h5JvDnRc=.sha-256@antelope.email>
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To: Arnt Gulbrandsen <arnt@gulbrandsen.priv.no>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/extra/P1T69Jf-v9_iLfLDBVQq4IM_NhY>
Subject: Re: [Extra] Meeting minutes and notes from today
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> Right. I feel that the main disconnect here is that the reject/fcc
> combination may cause one party (the site/company/...) to make a false
> representation about delivery on the instructions of another (the
> addressee).

That's part of it, but not the entire story. The main issue is undoubtedly
the ability of a user to get the site as a whole to lie about whether or
mail was delivered to them.

But consider the case of system-level use of reject :fcc. This is also
problematic. For one thing, if this results in a 5YZ response in the SMTP
diaglogue, the :fcc copy is going to differ from the DSN that's sent to the
originator (assuming a DSN is even sent - what about SUBMIT?). So what you
have here is a different form of lying: The administrator (or however
owns the system-level sieve) gets a wholly synthetic DSN that may
differ substantially from what the remote system actually sent.

I suppose you could address this issue by making the action of :fcc conditional
on whether or not a DSN/MDN, on the theory that the point of :fcc is to capture
the DSN/MDN, not the underlying message. 

I also note in passing that it's not a reliable means of capturing the
underlying message, since the DSN/MDN may not include the whole thing. So it's
actually kind of a worst case: You can't be sure that the message is there, but
you also can't assume it isn't.

> When those two are the same, this is okayish. Lying on my
> own accord is not pretty, but it is better than lying because someone
> else told me to.

> The right answer may be that reject/fcc should be
> available only when the mta owner and the script owner are the same. Or
> that may be unwarranted complexity, and the right answer is to cater to
> one of the two cases and knowingly disregard the other.

I don't think this addresses all the issues. What does appear to me to do so is
to require the use of an MDN for user-level reject :fcc. As for system-level,
I'll again point out that we lack the necessary context for discussing this in
our documents, but if we were to do so I'd say :fcc on a system-level sieve
only provides a copy of the DSN if the system produced one.

				Ned