[Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement
John Levine <johnl@ietf.email> Mon, 22 June 2026 21:44 UTC
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From: John Levine <johnl@ietf.email>
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Subject: [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement
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It appears that Richard Clayton <richard@highwayman.com> said: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Hash: SHA1 > >In message <c92d0ad4-ed81-4c8c-8630-2c83003c7def@alestrix.de>, Alexander >Stumpf <dkim=40alestrix.de@dmarc.ietf.org> writes > >>How about including the PQC public key as another info in the header and only >>store its SHA3 in a TXT record? SHA3 is, as of now, quantum-safe. > >that makes PQ handling very different from other algorithms, not >impossible but rather messy for the code to handle Depends what the interface to the crypto is. If it's "here's the body or header hash, return a blob of base64" it wouldn't be that messy. But we need to decide whether how much of a problem we think it is if the keys are too big to fit in one packet. If you're using 2K RSA keys, the packets are already pretty close to 512, so my inclination is to say that the keys are whatever size they are, so be it. If people are using DoT or DoH they'll be wrapped in TCP anyway, and nobody seems to think that's a problem. R's, John
- [Ietf-dkim] PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Stephen Farrell
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Alexander Stumpf
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Stephen Farrell
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R. Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Murray S. Kucherawy
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Michael Deutschmann
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Multiple algorithm rules (was Re: Re:… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple algorithm rules (was Re:… John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple algorithm rules (was Re:… Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Bron Gondwana
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Bron Gondwana
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Mauro De Gennaro
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Mauro De Gennaro
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Taavi Eomäe
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Edmund Lodewijks