[Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement
Richard Clayton <richard@highwayman.com> Sun, 21 June 2026 10:36 UTC
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Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 11:32:45 +0100
To: ietf-dkim@ietf.org
From: Richard Clayton <richard@highwayman.com>
References: <CAAFsWK3DawKLZ1zvxjSTDDzqy+40Rnqzzd2Sxa-t8Hv2Rk8mKw@mail.gmail.com> <db66bfa4-e6ba-4909-bc28-c33516d0414e@cs.tcd.ie> <20260621014122.A2C6C11123A0C@ary.qy> <c92d0ad4-ed81-4c8c-8630-2c83003c7def@alestrix.de>
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Subject: [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
In message <c92d0ad4-ed81-4c8c-8630-2c83003c7def@alestrix.de>, Alexander
Stumpf <dkim=40alestrix.de@dmarc.ietf.org> writes
>How about including the PQC public key as another info in the header and only
>store its SHA3 in a TXT record? SHA3 is, as of now, quantum-safe.
that makes PQ handling very different from other algorithms, not
impossible but rather messy for the code to handle
of course we could do all algorithms that way, but it would mean that
everyone had to change what was recorded in the DNS in order to use
DKIM2. That is not a sensible route to consider ...
... so let us pose the question as to what is to be recommended to us on
the basis that key handling will be essentially the same. If the answer
is that we have asked for the impossible only then should we consider
what type of engineering we should live with
- --
richard @ highwayman . com "Nothing seems the same
Still you never see the change from day to day
And no-one notices the customs slip away"
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- [Ietf-dkim] PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Stephen Farrell
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Alexander Stumpf
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Stephen Farrell
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R. Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Murray S. Kucherawy
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Michael Deutschmann
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Multiple algorithm rules (was Re: Re:… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple algorithm rules (was Re:… John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple algorithm rules (was Re:… Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Bron Gondwana
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Bron Gondwana
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Mauro De Gennaro
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Mauro De Gennaro
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Taavi Eomäe
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Edmund Lodewijks