[Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement
Hannah Stern <hannah.stern@1und1.de> Thu, 15 October 2026 13:09 UTC
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From: Hannah Stern <hannah.stern@1und1.de>
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Subject: [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement
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Hi! On 7/28/26 17:38, John Levine wrote: > It appears that Wei Chuang<weihaw@google.com> said: > > [...] > >> I also looked around DNSOPS for PQC advice. I found that they seem to be >> actively working >> <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/Yr6A91U5gbjZ_L6NkMj8mbgTeQE/> >> on rules for handling greylisting algorithms on short notice via >> draft-huque-dnsop-multi-alg-rules >> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-huque-dnsop-multi-alg-rules/>. We >> likely need a similar discussion for DKIM2 on how to gracefully handle >> greylisting of the classical RSA/Ed25519 signature. > As I said in DNSOP, I think this is a bad idea becauase I don't think that > a typical DNS operator (or mail operator) knows enough about cryptography > to use such a feature sensibly. > > If you think a signing algorithm is broken, just stop signing with it. > I think that DKIM signatures are likely to be pretty far down the list > of things attacked with PQ computers since they're short lived and the > stuff they sign is usually low value. If I want to phish people, there > are a lot cheaper ways than using a quantum computer to make a fake > DKIM signature. My impression is also that a) I'm not sure how likely it is in the first place for quantum attacks to become practical at all b) Even if they do so, I'd guess they'll stay very expensive for yet more time c) I'd agree with you that DKIM keys won't be extra high on the priority list of those operating such machines. However, I'd like to add something: "[...] DKIM signatures [...] short lived [...]" I think this might miss the point a little. As far as I understand, the potential quantum attacks would probably be against the keys. So the effort isn't proportional to the number of signatures one would like to fake, but only to the number of keys involved. So so for sites with long-lived DKIM keys (much mail traffic with the same key), the effort/costs would be amortized over a much larger number of mails (or faked mails) than for sites with short-lived DKIM keys. So a partial mitigation of potential quantum attacks even without employing PQ algorithms would be rotating keys daily (removing old keys from DNS after 14 days). Then a potential quantum attacker would get even less value for the effort/costs. > Re the "AND" thing, if we really think that's important, we can add > a double signing algorithm where the keys and signatures are the > two individual ones concatenated. No need to add more complication > to the spec. After my mail suggesting such a combined algorithm, I read some rationales against them too (in favor of using one of the PQ algorithms "purely"). But then this would still leave us the way to decide to specify both a "pure" PQ algorithm, and a ed25519+PQ (concatenation based) algorithm. A bit orthogonal to that is the discussion we're still having elsewhere how to go on with the current spec ambiguities about multiple signature entries. But regardless which direction, I'd not like algorithm specific special rules like "in this combination it's AND, otherwise it's OR". > [...] > Key rotation in DKIM1 doesn't work in practice, mostly because you have > to have separate selectors for different algorithms which means double > signing, which risks losing mail in badly designed receivers that > penalize signatures they can't verify. I think we fixed this in DKIM2. IMO not completely. > Also, the DNS crowd puts a lot of emphasis on keeping responses small. > While ed25519 is smaller than RSA, it's not enough smaller that it > would make any different in mail handling. I'm not sure about this. IIRC an ED25519 key is 256 or 257 bits, i.e. 43 base64 characters. A 2048 bit RSA key is those 2048 bits plus a bit for the 17 bit exponent. That is 345 base64 characters, i.e. already needs (at least) two at-most-255-char "entries" in the TXT record. But I've seen elsewhere in the discussion that it might be reasonable that even an ML-DSA-44 key would still be at least bearable with 1750 base64 characters. Hannah. -- Hannah Stern Software Developer Mail Transfer Development 1&1 Mail & Media Development & Technology GmbH | | | Phone: +49 721 91374-4519 E-Mail:hannah.stern@1und1.de | Web:www.mail-and-media.com www.gmx.net www.web.de www.mail.com www.united-internet-media.de Hauptsitz Montabaur, Amtsgericht Montabaur, HRB 5452 Geschäftsführer: Alexander Charles, Dr. Michael Hagenau, Thomas Ludwig, Dr. Verena Patzelt Member of United Internet Diese E-Mail kann vertrauliche und/oder gesetzlich geschützte Informationen enthalten. Wenn Sie nicht der bestimmungsgemäße Adressat sind oder diese E-Mail irrtümlich erhalten haben, unterrichten Sie bitte den Absender und vernichten Sie diese E-Mail. 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- [Ietf-dkim] PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Stephen Farrell
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Alexander Stumpf
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Stephen Farrell
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R. Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Murray S. Kucherawy
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
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- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Multiple algorithm rules (was Re: Re:… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple algorithm rules (was Re:… John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple algorithm rules (was Re:… Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Vittorio
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- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Bron Gondwana
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Bron Gondwana
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Vittorio
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- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Mauro De Gennaro
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
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- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Vittorio
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- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Mauro De Gennaro
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Taavi Eomäe
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Edmund Lodewijks