[Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a PQC Threat Model statement

Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com> Sun, 25 October 2026 21:21 UTC

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In-Reply-To: <3f3a4c9c068344d4d89c99a4a93b2869@itb.it>
From: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2026 14:21:12 -0700
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Subject: [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a PQC Threat Model statement
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On Sun, Oct 25, 2026 at 12:26 PM Vittorio <v.moccia@itb.it> wrote:

> Hello Wei,
>
> Two observations, taking as given the point already made in this thread
> that an AND flag does not deliver what it promises when the receiver has
> not implemented the stronger algorithm.
>
> The first is that making the handling of an unimplemented algorithm a
> SHOULD has an undefined effect: the same flag produces AND at a verifier
> that implements every algorithm present, the OR outcome at one that does
> not and whatever local policy prefers elsewhere. So the signer cannot
> know what its own flag will produce.
>

Apologies. I'm not following.  Consider creating an example?


> The second point is the result values. In RFC 8601 Section 2.7.1
> “policy” means the message was signed but some aspect of the signature
> was not acceptable to the ADMD, which is not the case of a verifier that
> cannot evaluate it. “softfail” is not a result of the dkim method at all
> and belongs to spf. The nearest existing value is “neutral”, which
> covers a signature that contained syntax errors or was “not otherwise
> able to be processed”. In DKIM1 a signature in an algorithm the verifier
> does not implement is not reported at all, since RFC 6376 Section 3.3.4
> says that verifiers MUST ignore such signatures. The dkim2 method as
> defined in draft-gondwana-dkim2-authres-00 has pass, fail, permerror,
> temperror and none, so it offers none of these and says nothing about
> this case.
>

I'm simply trying to distinguish the local policy cases that will be
defined for future feedback reports.  A sender needs to know how receivers
are adopting a new algorithm they sign with, and needs to be distinguished
from dkim2-spec PASS and FAIL results.


> Leaving things as they are does not settle the question either, because
> the present text does not say one thing. Section 14.1 states that “A
> Verifier MAY cease verifying once a single failure is detected”, while
> Section 14.6 states that “If there is more than one signature provided
> then they MUST all be checked if the Verifier is able to do so. If any
> signature fails then an error SHOULD be reported.” Section 14.1 also
> leaves the form of that report open, since verifiers wishing to
> communicate results to other parts of the mail system “may do so in
> whatever manner they see fit”. There is no defined state for the error
> to be reported into.
>
> What is missing is one rule in the protocol for how a hop carrying
> several signatures is evaluated, covering the case of a signature the
> verifier is unable to evaluate. Stated once, it makes the verdict on a
> hop the same at every verifier. One such rule is that a signature the
> verifier cannot evaluate is, for that verifier, in the same position as
> a signature that is not present, so the hop is judged on the signatures
> it can check. The treatment of such a signature as absent is already
> DKIM1’s, as noted above. What is new in DKIM2 is that the verdict is
> reached per hop, which is why the rule has to be stated. It also has a
> consequence for reporting: results that follow from a rule everyone
> applies can be checked by a later verifier against what it computes
> itself and counted together across receivers, while results produced
> under a rule each verifier chooses can be neither checked nor added up.
>
>
Agreed: the current text does not reflect any of this multi signature
evaluation proposal, and would have to be updated.
-Wei