[Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement
Richard Clayton <richard@highwayman.com> Mon, 19 October 2026 15:51 UTC
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Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 16:49:37 +0100
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From: Richard Clayton <richard@highwayman.com>
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Subject: [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement
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In message <1D3101F2-1DCC-4E76-B5BC-FE93AF82AEE7@stalw.art>, Mauro De
Gennaro <mauro=40stalw.art@dmarc.ietf.org> writes
>Some implementation experience that may help before Wednesday's interim:
>
>I have implemented mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 in mail-auth, the Rust library behind
>Stalwart's DKIM2 support, as part of updating it to draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-
>07.
hah, I am reading WG messages in the wrong order, you have beaten Bron's
Claude to it !
>While implementing it I found some points the current texts leave open.
That's charitable, "gets wrong" would be closer
>1. What is signed. Section 3.4 of -07 says the algorithm "computes a hash over
>all the Message-Instance and DKIM2-Signature fields as described in Section 12.8
>using SHA-512 [FIPS-180-4] as the hash-alg.
I think it's pretty clear we should use either the LAMPs composite
(where the hash is fed into ed25519 and the ML-DSA-44 gets fed the raw
data)
> I implemented (a), which matches Richard's pointer to the LAMPS draft and
>avoids hashing twice.
yes I think that's right
>2. Context string. Neither draft specifies an application context, so for the
>composite the LAMPS default (empty) applies, and that is what I use. Plain ML-
>DSA also takes a context string. Should DKIM2 define one (for example "DKIM2")
>for domain separation, or is empty deliberate?
empty avoids some bike-shedding, DKIM2 might make some crypto-purists
who worry about cross-protocol attack.
>3. Key encoding. I publish the raw composite public key in p=, that is the
>1312-byte ML-DSA-44 public key followed by the 32-byte Ed25519 public key, not a
>SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure, which is how I read dns-01 together with LAMPS
>Sections 4.1 and 5. Given the RSA format errata in dns-01 Appendix A, it would
>help to say explicitly whether SPKI is allowed for the new key types.
I think the correct answer here is "we should use whatever off-the-shelf
libraries spit out" (presumably there is some consensus there) ... but
if we don't use a composite scheme then we don't need to decide
>If the interim decides to go with plain ML-DSA-44 instead, adding it on my side
>is a small change, and I will add it to the playground as well so there is
>something to interop against.
thank you
- --
richard @ highwayman . com "Nothing seems the same
Still you never see the change from day to day
And no-one notices the customs slip away"
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- [Ietf-dkim] PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Stephen Farrell
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Alexander Stumpf
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Stephen Farrell
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R. Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Murray S. Kucherawy
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Michael Deutschmann
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Multiple algorithm rules (was Re: Re:… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple algorithm rules (was Re:… John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple algorithm rules (was Re:… Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Bron Gondwana
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Bron Gondwana
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: Multiple signatures semantics (wa… Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: multiple algorithms, was Re: PQC … Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Mauro De Gennaro
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John R Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Viktor Dukhovni
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: broken ways to try to deal with a… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Mauro De Gennaro
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Taavi Eomäe
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Hannah Stern
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: PQC Threat Model statement Edmund Lodewijks