Re: [ietf-smtp] [OT] (signed TLDs)

Hector Santos <hsantos@isdg.net> Tue, 15 October 2019 16:52 UTC

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Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 12:52:18 -0400
From: Hector Santos <hsantos@isdg.net>
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Subject: Re: [ietf-smtp] [OT] (signed TLDs)
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I wish I understood more of this discussion and "basic problem," if 
any, but in years past, we use to share common "Network" files using 
dialup, ftp, web, etc.   We sort of do it now with the CA-BUNDLE.TXT 
file for the Intermediate CAs certs.  When I build new OpenSSL images, 
the wcSSL package distribution includes a new ca-bundle.txt file with 
new CA certs merged.  The main bundle is from:

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/bagder/ca-bundle/master/ca-bundle.crt

In the last update, I merged a bunch of them:

##  07/31/18 01:56 pm
##  - Using MergeCACerts.cmd
##  - merge newbundle\ca-bundle-20180626.txt 
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/bagder/ca-bundle/master/ca-bundle.crt
##  - merge newbundle\AddTrustExternalCARoot.pem   Comodo
##  - merge newbundle\COMODORSAAddTrustCA.pem Comodo
##  - merge 
newbundle\COMODORSAOrganizationValidationSecureServerCA.pem Comodo
##  - merge newbundle\chain.pem  Let's Encrypt
##  - merge newbundle\gd_bundle-g2-g1.crt  GoDaddy
##  - merge newbundle\gd_bundle.crt GoDaddy

But it just dawn on me, should a site like the above domain be trusted 
as a TTP (Trusted Third Party) CA?  The bundle can contain TTP 
"posers."   For that matter, why should the user trust any CA anyway?

--
HLS




On 10/15/2019 7:33 AM, Tony Finch wrote:
> John R Levine <johnl@taugh.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 14 Oct 2019, Tony Finch wrote:
>>>
>>> RFC 7344 did not include bootstrapping, but that was added by RFC 8078.
>>> Sadly it's more like a set of hints rather than an actual protocol...
>>
>> It's just hand waving.  The guys who wrote it know that, but the problem is
>> that there was no consensus on how to bootstrap.  It's a hard problem since
>> it's sort of inherent that there's nothing other than a DNSSEC signature that
>> reliably authenticates a DNSSEC record.
>
> I think if we get more registries copying .cz and/or .ch then some
> consensus may emerge but there doesn't seem to be much movement in this
> area...
>
> Tony.
>