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Re: [DNSOP] Practical issues deploying DNSSEC into the home.

Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@ICSI.Berkeley.EDU> Wed, 11 September 2013 19:56 UTC

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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Practical issues deploying DNSSEC into the home.
From: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@ICSI.Berkeley.EDU>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+LwjTGZz9BrE1EcuQb9abv+MvOPVTjWHiSBCj774drnF15A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2013 12:56:27 -0700
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References: <CAGhGL2APj-XfuMUHgLsELnZRbRNCLrjMBxFBtcg4zx+5SG7Bag@mail.gmail.com> <3C96E4A9-7E78-421F-A437-7091AEBEB5AA@ogud.com> <20130910224518.GA99190@isc.org> <91AFF488-A3F6-4E30-B542-B5C107DB6114@ogud.com> <CAMm+LwjkOEO6t5v6qMjc036JGaoFi=3jFPNDp=xM=zK5R8_k7A@mail.gmail.com> <D9B745AC-8FCE-4742-AAE1-CC1AC4293F0E@hopcount.ca> <alpine.LFD.2.10.1309111202350.13632@bofh.nohats.ca> <CAMm+LwieYmZNUybCgpdkytb9EfmiraTVNJdTUS6aeNJE5=8PEQ@mail.gmail.com> <F4F9D8B4-57BF-4CB4-A200-3B77A3966A2B@icsi.berkeley.edu> <CAMm+LwjTGZz9BrE1EcuQb9abv+MvOPVTjWHiSBCj774drnF15A@mail.gmail.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Cc: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@ICSI.Berkeley.EDU>, "ietf@ietf.org TF" <ietf@ietf.org>, "dnsop@ietf.org WG" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Evan Hunt <each@isc.org>, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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On Sep 11, 2013, at 12:38 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> I disagree.  DNSSEC is not just DNS: its the only available, deployed, and (mostly) accessible global PKI currently in existence which also includes a constrained path of trust which follows already established business relationships.
> 
> Except that virtually nobody uses DNSSEC and most of the registrars don't support it.

I strongly disagree:

I had an easier time registering my DNSSEC test domain's DS records with the registrar than the nameservers themselves, using an obnoxious company that sponsors a NASCAR driver and has obnoxious TV ads.

Comcast and Google Public DNS both validate DNSSEC on all requests.

A small minority of clients can't fetch DNSSEC records, but most actually can, either through one of the recursive resolvers or over the Internet.

> And then there is that other PKI that is actually used to support a trillion odd dollars worth of global e-commerce per year.

Which the NSA is man-in-the-middling with abandon, in due to no-small-part the lack of a constrained path of trust.  Google has effectively given up on the TLS PKI for their own use in Chrome: they hardcode the Google sub-CA.

--
Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc

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