Re: [Int-area] Middleboxes to aid the deployment of MPTCP

Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu> Tue, 18 July 2017 22:49 UTC

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To: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Cc: Olivier Bonaventure <olivier.bonaventure@tessares.net>, Internet Area <int-area@ietf.org>, tsv-area@ietf.org
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From: Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu>
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Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 15:49:41 -0700
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] Middleboxes to aid the deployment of MPTCP
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On 7/18/2017 3:43 PM, Tom Herbert wrote:
>> TCP must be E2E and fall back to legacy endpoints without a reconnection
>> attempt, as required by RFC793.
>>
>> These aren't generic solutions; they're attacks on a TCP connection, IMO.
>>
> I agree. This seems be akin to stateful firewalls model that impose
> artificial requirements on networking (like every TCP packet for a
> connection must got through some middlebox or the connection is
> dropped). We need to move things back to E2E semantics for transport
> protocols-- nodes that try to maintain transport state in the network
> should be considered the problem not the solution!
I'm a little less concerned with state in the network (link layers have
state too - both hard and soft).

My primary concern is this as an attack on TCP - or its equivalence to
an attack. I though the point of true TCP and lower layer security was
to prevent such attacks.

Perhaps that's why I consider TLS and TCPcrypt to be so badly misnamed.
They don't protect *TCP* at all.

Joe