Re: [IPsec] IPsec Digest, Vol 123, Issue 21

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Sun, 17 August 2014 13:28 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 16:27:43 +0300
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To: Les Leposo <leposo@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] IPsec Digest, Vol 123, Issue 21
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On Aug 16, 2014, at 12:48 PM, Les Leposo <leposo@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi
> 
> some points of discussion below.
> 
>> A scheme like this would drain the battery on top of the current
>> re-establishing draining, that already prevents me from using an
>> always-on profile - my iphone won't last for 4 hours.
>> 
>> Perhaps we should look at other types of puzzles that do not depend on
>> raw CPU power?
> Great question.
> 
> imho, if the hash calculations (and ike) are a big enough culprits, then perhaps the mobile SoC folks should consider bringing onboard IP that  accelerates/offloads the hash calculations (and other aspects of ike) to more energy efficient component/sub-system?

That’s just an arms race. If phones get specialized hardware that can do 2^25 hashes in a second, the attackers can get such hardware too, and we’ll have to turn up the difficulty to 25 bits. Older hardware (like older phones and computers) will suffer.

Yoav