Re: [IPsec] IPsec Digest, Vol 123, Issue 21

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Mon, 18 August 2014 16:34 UTC

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Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 12:33:57 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Cc: ipsec@ietf.org, Les Leposo <leposo@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] IPsec Digest, Vol 123, Issue 21
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On Mon, 18 Aug 2014, Tero Kivinen wrote:

> If dead peer detection is implemented properly, as is described in the
> rfc5996, the device can safely go to sleep if there is no traffic
> going between the client and server, and when it wakes up from the
> sleep the IKEv2 connection will still be there, and the other end has
> not teared down the IKE SA (provided there was nothing that would have
> caused it to try to send traffic to the sleeping node).

If the server has enough resources, yes. It should not kill clients with
dpd.

> If course if the device is not really sleeping, i.e. you just blank
> the screen, and are still able to receive and send packets, then there
> is no point of tearing down the IKE SA.

could someone at apple please relay this! This is stupidly draining my
battery :P

> I.e. the recent connections table has list of IP-address who have
> tried to connect to you, but have not yet authenticated, i.e. either
> real devices in the middle of authentication, or attackers. The real
> devices in the middle of authentication will not try to reconnect, as
> they are still continuing the process.

You would need the port number too to support multple clients behind the
same NAT router, upon which the attacker can then use multiple ports too.

> This means attacker needs one new routable IP-address for each attack.

for each 65k attacks.

Paul