Re: [keyassure] Objective: Restrictive versus Supplementary Models

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Thu, 31 March 2011 00:37 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: mrex@sap.com
Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2011 02:38:59 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <201103310026.p2V0QLQO007637@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> from "Martin Rex" at Mar 31, 11 02:26:21 am
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Subject: Re: [keyassure] Objective: Restrictive versus Supplementary Models
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Martin Rex wrote:
> 
> > 
> > I think this is an important consideration. However a relevant
> > question for a 2119-level MUST seems to be whether we wish to have
> > this data rejected if not DNSSEC signed.
> > What's your view on that?
> 
> I'm much less worried about false positives resulting in DoS, which
> can be more easily achieved attacking at the network layer (IP, TCP).

Actually, a DoS based on spoofing an DANE TLSA record with incorrect
data and a long TTL into a DNS cache might turn out to be devastatingly
effective when unsiged TLSA records are accepted.

-Martin