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Re: [keyassure] Objective: Restrictive versus Supplementary Models

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Thu, 31 March 2011 13:35 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: rbarnes@bbn.com
Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2011 15:36:41 +0200
In-Reply-To: <E10206C6-2A07-4C76-8C21-C7E889FD99BB@bbn.com> from "Richard L. Barnes" at Mar 31, 11 03:29:18 pm
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Subject: Re: [keyassure] Objective: Restrictive versus Supplementary Models
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Richard L. Barnes wrote:
> 
> So it's a social engineering attack?  Might as well just send an email trojan.
> 
> This is the same result as
> -- Hijacking the TCP session and feeding in a fake cert 
> -- Spoofing the A record and sending the client to the wrong host (like ekr said)
> 
> --Richard

To me, processing unsigned TLSA records is similar to
processing unsigned OCSP responses or unsigned CRLs.
I would not do the latter, and I'm in doubt that the former
is a good idea.

-Martin

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