Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text

["Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <[e-mail]>]

I agree with Russ, and support “sole“ MTI 2/3. 

TNX

Regards,
Uri

> On Jan 20, 2022, at 15:37, Russ Housley <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Selecting one MTI provides the broadest possible interoperability.  I think it would be harmful at this stage to divide the implementers into 0/1 and 2/3.
> 
> Russ
> 
>> On Jan 20, 2022, at 3:33 PM, Mališa Vučinić <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>> Russ,
>> 
>> Thanks for your feedback. Could you state any technical arguments why do you believe that would be the best way forward?
>> 
>> Mališa
>> 
>>>> On 20 Jan 2022, at 21:22, Russ Housley <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> I would prefer to see one MTI (Option 2).  I can live with that MIT being 0/1 or 2/3, and I have a mild preference for 2/3.
>>> 
>>> Russ
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On Jan 20, 2022, at 12:03 PM, Mališa Vučinić <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Dear all,
>>>> 
>>>> During the last LAKE interim meeting, we discussed the issue
>>>> of an MTI cipher suite and we agreed for the chairs to open a
>>>> thread on the subject. As a reminder, the previous discussion
>>>> points on this topic are summarized in github [1] and in
>>>> John’s mail dated 13 May 2021 [2].
>>>> 
>>>> We’d like to see if there is rough consensus in the WG on
>>>> this topic, at this moment in time. Knowing that the formal
>>>> analysis of the EDHOC-12 specification is under way, we
>>>> should keep in mind that additional input may arrive down the
>>>> road from teams working in the computational model.
>>>> 
>>>> As a reminder, the most recently discussed text for this
>>>> is in a PR [3] and states:
>>>> 
>>>> “For many constrained IoT devices it is problematic to support several crypto primitives. Existing devices can be expected to support either ECDSA or EdDSA. Cipher suites 0 (AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, 8, X25519, EdDSA, AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256) and 1 (AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA-256, 16, X25519, EdDSA, AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256) only differ in size of the MAC length, so supporting one or both of these is no essential difference. Similarly for cipher suites 2 (AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, 8, P-256, ES256, AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256) and 3 (AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA-256, 16, P-256, ES256, AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256). To enable as much interoperability as possible, less constrained devices SHOULD implement all four cipher suites 0-3. Constrained endpoints SHOULD implement cipher suites 0 and 1, or cipher suites 2 and 3. Implementations only need to implement the algorithms needed for their supported methods.”
>>>> 
>>>> The options we see at this moment in time are:
>>>> 
>>>> Option 1: Keep current text as-is unless/until more feedback
>>>> is provided that motivates re-opening this issue
>>>> Option 2: Proceed with selecting a single MTI cipher suite
>>>> 
>>>> We'd like to know if the WG can live with Option 1. Note that
>>>> doesn't mean you think option 1 is perfect, just that it's
>>>> something with which you can live. If you prefer option 2 or
>>>> some other option please suggest specific text.
>>>> 
>>>> Mališa and Stephen
>>>> 
>>>> [1] https://github.com/lake-wg/edhoc/issues/22
>>>> [2] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lake/75nRaD6czYG6RqLT06Qe8C_lsaM/
>>>> [3] https://github.com/lake-wg/edhoc/pull/225/files
>>> 
>> 
> 
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