Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect

Kerberos and NFS are two notable exceptions.

On Tue, Aug 6, 2019 at 5:38 PM Thomas Hardjono <hardjono@mit.edu> wrote:
>
> Hi Ira,
>
> I’m familiar with NEA — NEA & TNC (and NAP & NAC) are relatively recent.  I’m talking about the majority of RFCs coming out of the Security Area since the mid-1990s.
>
> This was a core part of the End-to-End Principle (e.g. key management and handling of keys at the edges, out side the scope of the IETF).
>
>
>
> /thomas/
>
> ___________________________________
>
> On Aug 6, 2019, at 8:24 PM, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> I disagree with this characterization of the IETF's historic interest.
>
> IETF NEA (built on contributed TCG TNC protocols) is *all* about
> the security and health of endpoints.  And IETF NEA is now being
> leveraged heavily in IETF SACM for that very reason.  SACM is
> of course *mostly* about the security and health of endpoints and
> only incidentally about middleboxes.
>
> Cheers,
> - Ira
>
> Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
> Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG
> Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG
> Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
> Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group
> Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG
> IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB
> Blue Roof Music / High North Inc
> http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic
> http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc
> mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com
> PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839  906-494-2434
>
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 6, 2019 at 5:45 PM Thomas Hardjono <hardjono@mit.edu> wrote:
>>
>>
>> >>> 1) Attacking the system directly.
>>
>> >>> 2) Delivering an attack through a user-initiated session or exfiltrating data through said session
>>
>> >>> 4) Passive monitoring of all traffic
>>
>> >>> 5) Monitoring and tracking all user's traffic inside their session.
>>
>>
>> Historically the IETF has focused on protocols and communications security. This was an explicit choice/decision of the IETF community in the mid-1990s. So, all the protocols we have (ISAKMP, IKE, IPsec, TLS, etc.) have addressed a threat model that was focused on the communications channel. The security of the end-point, such as a Client or device, was out of scope (until now, I guess, depending).
>>
>> If the IETF’s scope is going to be expanded, I’d suggest the IETF developing an abstraction model and terminology that helps discussion. Otherwise we end up boiling the ocean with too many words, use-cases and scenarios.
>>
>> At the Montreal SAAG meeting I mentioned the term end-point “state”.  One way to map the above list of threats would be to express it abstractly in terms of state and the protection of state information/data. So, the above list could be mapped to something like this:
>>
>> (i) Unauthorized modification of end-point state. (i.e. attacking a client OS.).
>>
>> (ii) Unauthorized exfiltration of end-point state information (i.e. exfiltration of data, both system-data and user-data, from a machine).
>>
>> (iii) Malicious substitution of state in transit (i.e. hi-jacking a connection and doing a MITM).
>>
>> (iv) Unhindered reporting of end-point state information (i.e. authentic reporting from a MIB in a device).
>>
>>
>> You get my point. It’s no longer just about protection of the communication channel and transport protocol resiliency.  It’s now about the “stuff” at the end of the channel.
>>
>>
>> — thomas —
>>
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