Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description

To borrow your words…  “If we are going to take security seriously”…  we need to understand and document the full attack surface.  So let us start listing them out.  Here are four.

Attack: Active remote attack
Exposure: Full compromise of system and data
Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible
Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protections
Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate
Severity: High
Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement 

Attack: Active in-band attack
Exposure; Full compromise of system and data
Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible
Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protections, user awareness training, content and DNS filtering
Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate
Severity: High
Kill-Chain Phase: Delivery and Exploitation 

Attack: Passive monitoring of traffic
Exposure: Information about where traffic is going and potentially details of the content being shared 
Client Knowledge: No, it is very hard to detect passive monitoring tools
Protection Possibilities: Encrypt traffic 
Headwinds: Global adoption of better encryption
Severity: Low
Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance

Attack: Active in-band monitoring and tracking 
Exposure: Information about what the user is doing and where they are going 
Client Knowledge: Generally no 
Protection Possibilities: Client and network level protections
Headwinds: Some clients are making it hard to deploy client side protections 
Severity: Low
Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance

Thanks,
Bret
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"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."

> On Aug 2, 2019, at 9:18 PM, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:
> 
> On Sat, Aug 3, 2019, at 03:58, Michael Richardson wrote:
>> What I'm trying to say is that there are some threats that we deal with
>> on the Capital-Internet that are far more manageable in the small.
> 
> Like a red rag to a bull...
> 
> I don't think that this is a sustainable attitude.  If we are going to take security seriously, we have to consider every networked device to be exposed to a hostile environment.  Now that doesn't mean that you can't take steps to limit hostility in networks, and there might be sound reasons to believe that the degree to which you have to expend resources in defense of certain attacks is different as a result.  But the notion of a gooey middle remains a big part of the problem statement.
> 
> This isn't really on-topic for this list as I understand it, and I wasn't planning to say much here until someone said this.  Sorry Michael :)
> 
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