Re: [Model-t] [e-mail] list description

[Ted Lemon <[e-mail]>]

Yes. It would also be good to avoid domain-specific jargon. Presumably the goal here is to provide something of value to the whole community, not something that only people who are familiar with a very specific vernacular can use. 

Of course, I might be mistaken about the intended scope of this work, so if this sounds wrong it would be good to get consensus on that. 

Sent from my iPhone

> On Aug 3, 2019, at 12:52 PM, Jim Fenton <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
>> On 8/2/19 9:24 PM, Bret Jordan wrote:
>> 
>> To borrow your words…  “If we are going to take security seriously”…
>>  we need to understand and document the full attack surface.  So let
>> us start listing them out.  Here are four.
>> 
>> 
>> Attack: Active remote attack
>> Exposure: Full compromise of system and data
>> Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible
>> Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protections
>> Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate
>> Severity: High
>> Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement
> 
> [etc.]
> 
> Perhaps we need to decide what we consider a threat model to be. I see
> Bret's list as a collection of specific attacks (tactics), while I
> consider a threat model to be at a higher level than that, e.g., whether
> nation-states, or supply chain threats, should be part of that model.
> 
> When I was working on the draft that became RFC 4686 (DKIM Threat
> Analysis), Russ Housley gave me some very good coaching about how to
> structure that. He suggested that it should describe:
> 
> - The nature and location of the bad actors
> - What the bad actors' capabilities are
> - What they intend to accomplish via their attacks
> 
> How do we want to define threat model?
> 
> -Jim
> 
> 
> 
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