Re: [multipathtcp] High-level design decisions /architecture

[Joe Touch <[e-mail]>]

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marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
> Joe Touch escribió:
>>
>>> Security
>>>
>>> ======
>>>
>>>     * exchange a token in the initial SYN for the MPTCP connection, and
>>>       include the token when subflows /paths are added to the connection
>>>           o [Question: Is the same token used whether the sender or
>>>             receiver (of the MPTCP connection) adds the subflow? Is the
>>>             same technique used for removing subflows? And closing
>>>             connections, ie DATA FIN?]
>>>     
>>
>> Let's please not call this "security". Call it a flow identifier, but
>> it's trivial for on-path attackers to see, and anything small enough to
>> be appropriate for a SYN is likely to be too small to prevent exhaustion
>> attacks.
>>
>>  
>>>     * security mechanisms will not interfere with end-to-end
>>>       authentication etc     
>>
>> Yes. Specifically IMO there ought to be a TCP-AO mode supported - e.g.,
>> using socketpair of the original connection for the pseudoheader used
>> for MAC calculation.
>>
>>   
> It would make sense to contrast the protection provided by TCP-AO witht
> he threats identified in the threat analysis and see how many of these
> it solves.

Agreed. Same for the nonce.

Joe
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