Re: [multipathtcp] High-level design decisions /architecture

marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es> Tue, 03 November 2009 18:44 UTC

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Date: Tue, 03 Nov 2009 19:44:15 +0100
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
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To: Joe Touch <touch@ISI.EDU>
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Cc: multipathtcp@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [multipathtcp] High-level design decisions /architecture
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Joe Touch escribió:
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> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>   
>> Joe Touch escribió:
>>     
>>>> Security
>>>>
>>>> ======
>>>>
>>>>     * exchange a token in the initial SYN for the MPTCP connection, and
>>>>       include the token when subflows /paths are added to the connection
>>>>           o [Question: Is the same token used whether the sender or
>>>>             receiver (of the MPTCP connection) adds the subflow? Is the
>>>>             same technique used for removing subflows? And closing
>>>>             connections, ie DATA FIN?]
>>>>     
>>>>         
>>> Let's please not call this "security". Call it a flow identifier, but
>>> it's trivial for on-path attackers to see, and anything small enough to
>>> be appropriate for a SYN is likely to be too small to prevent exhaustion
>>> attacks.
>>>
>>>  
>>>       
>>>>     * security mechanisms will not interfere with end-to-end
>>>>       authentication etc     
>>>>         
>>> Yes. Specifically IMO there ought to be a TCP-AO mode supported - e.g.,
>>> using socketpair of the original connection for the pseudoheader used
>>> for MAC calculation.
>>>
>>>   
>>>       
>> It would make sense to contrast the protection provided by TCP-AO witht
>> he threats identified in the threat analysis and see how many of these
>> it solves.
>>     
>
> Agreed.
mmm, can you think of someone that could be willing to provide the text 
of such analysis?

>  Same for the nonce.
>
>   
That is already covered in the current threat analysis (see 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bagnulo-mptcp-threat-00)
i.e. the current threat analysis threats are analyzed for both a MPTCP 
that does not use any form of security and one based on tokens.
Since AO seems standard TCP protection, i think it make sense to extend 
the analysis to cover that

Regards, marcelo


> Joe
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