Re: [dnsext] draft-mohan-dns-query-xml-00.txt

David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org> Wed, 05 October 2011 14:22 UTC

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From: David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org>
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Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2011 07:25:39 -0700
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To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] draft-mohan-dns-query-xml-00.txt
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On Oct 4, 2011, at 3:54 PM, Brian Dickson wrote:
> This proposal is a very lightweight and elegant (IMHO) counter-counter-measure.

Not really. It is a hack that, if implemented, will ensure there is no pressure to actually fix broken infrastructures.  Realistically:

- states-sponsored censorship will continue to occur: states have a tendency to insist on that sort of thing, with guns if necessary;
- folks intentionally blocking working DNS to force the use of their name servers will figure out a way to continue blocking DNS: I have sufficient faith in the tenacity of such folks that all this will do is result in a cat-and-mouse game (e.g., it won't be that hard to figure out which HTTP{,S} server IP addresses to blacklist);
- middlebox vendors and lazy DNS operators won't need to fix their DNS implementations because there is now a HTTP{,S} bypass for the folks that whine about such things; and
- we now have to saddle DNSSEC server implementations (auth and recursive) with yet more complexity.  Permanently.

This feels like the wrong way to solve this problem.

Regards,
-drc

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