[OAUTH-WG] Fw: Breaking change in OAuth 2.0 rev. 23

Marius Scurtescu <mscurtescu@google.com> Wed, 14 March 2012 16:53 UTC

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From: Marius Scurtescu <mscurtescu@google.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2012 09:53:23 -0700
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Cc: Breno de Medeiros <breno@google.com>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Fw: Breaking change in OAuth 2.0 rev. 23
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Hi,

Nat Sakimura started a thread on the OpenID Connect list about a
breaking change introduced by rev 2.3

The paragraph in question is in section 2.1:

"A client application consisting of multiple components, each with its
own client type (e.g. a distributed client with both a confidential
server-based component and a public browser-based component), MUST
register each component separately as a different client to ensure
proper handling by the authorization server.  The authorization
server MAY provider tools to manage such complex clients through a
single administration interface."

http://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?difftype=--hwdiff&url2=draft-ietf-oauth-v2-23.txt

You can see the thread here:
http://lists.openid.net/pipermail/openid-specs-ab/Week-of-Mon-20120312/001672.html

This paragraph basically prevents response_type=code+token which is
already implemented by many providers and also relied on by OpenID
Connect.

The intent, I think, was to prevent clients from embedding the client
secret meant for a confidential client into a public client.
JavaScript based clients using the token flow do not need the client
secret, so this concern does not apply.

Thoughts?

Thanks,
Marius