[OAUTH-WG] First Draft of OAuth 2.1

Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> Thu, 12 March 2020 00:28 UTC

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From: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 17:28:22 -0700
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] First Draft of OAuth 2.1
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I'm happy to share that Dick and Torsten and I have published a first
draft of OAuth 2.1. We've taken the feedback from the discussions on
the list and incorporated that into the draft.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01

A summary of the differences between this draft and OAuth 2.0 can be
found in section 12, and I've copied them here below.

> This draft consolidates the functionality in OAuth 2.0 (RFC6749),
> OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC8252), Proof Key for Code Exchange
> (RFC7636), OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps
> (I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps), OAuth Security Best Current
> Practice (I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics), and Bearer Token Usage
> (RFC6750).
>
>   Where a later draft updates or obsoletes functionality found in the
>   original [RFC6749], that functionality in this draft is updated with
>   the normative changes described in a later draft, or removed
>   entirely.
>
>   A non-normative list of changes from OAuth 2.0 is listed below:
>
>   *  The authorization code grant is extended with the functionality
>      from PKCE ([RFC7636]) such that the only method of using the
>      authorization code grant according to this specification requires
>      the addition of the PKCE mechanism
>
>   *  Redirect URIs must be compared using exact string matching as per
>      Section 4.1.3 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>
>   *  The Implicit grant ("response_type=token") is omitted from this
>      specification as per Section 2.1.2 of
>      [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>
>   *  The Resource Owner Password Credentials grant is omitted from this
>      specification as per Section 2.4 of
>      [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>
>   *  Bearer token usage omits the use of bearer tokens in the query
>      string of URIs as per Section 4.3.2 of
>      [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>
>   *  Refresh tokens must either be sender-constrained or one-time use
>      as per Section 4.12.2 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01#section-12

I'm excited for the direction this is taking, and it has been a
pleasure working with Dick and Torsten on this so far. My hope is that
this first draft can serve as a good starting point for our future
discussions!

----
Aaron Parecki
aaronparecki.com
@aaronpk

P.S. This notice was also posted at
https://aaronparecki.com/2020/03/11/14/oauth-2-1