Re: [OAUTH-WG] First Draft of OAuth 2.1

["Schanzenbach, Martin" <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

I just read the document and have minor feedback:

Under "2.3 Client Authentication" you mention mTLS (RFC8705) and reference OpenID.
I am kind of missing RFC7523 here (JWT client authentication). Also, the OpenID link is broken.

Best
Martin

> On 12. Mar 2020, at 01:28, Aaron Parecki <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> I'm happy to share that Dick and Torsten and I have published a first
> draft of OAuth 2.1. We've taken the feedback from the discussions on
> the list and incorporated that into the draft.
> 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01
> 
> A summary of the differences between this draft and OAuth 2.0 can be
> found in section 12, and I've copied them here below.
> 
>> This draft consolidates the functionality in OAuth 2.0 (RFC6749),
>> OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC8252), Proof Key for Code Exchange
>> (RFC7636), OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps
>> (I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps), OAuth Security Best Current
>> Practice (I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics), and Bearer Token Usage
>> (RFC6750).
>> 
>>  Where a later draft updates or obsoletes functionality found in the
>>  original [RFC6749], that functionality in this draft is updated with
>>  the normative changes described in a later draft, or removed
>>  entirely.
>> 
>>  A non-normative list of changes from OAuth 2.0 is listed below:
>> 
>>  *  The authorization code grant is extended with the functionality
>>     from PKCE ([RFC7636]) such that the only method of using the
>>     authorization code grant according to this specification requires
>>     the addition of the PKCE mechanism
>> 
>>  *  Redirect URIs must be compared using exact string matching as per
>>     Section 4.1.3 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>> 
>>  *  The Implicit grant ("response_type=token") is omitted from this
>>     specification as per Section 2.1.2 of
>>     [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>> 
>>  *  The Resource Owner Password Credentials grant is omitted from this
>>     specification as per Section 2.4 of
>>     [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>> 
>>  *  Bearer token usage omits the use of bearer tokens in the query
>>     string of URIs as per Section 4.3.2 of
>>     [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>> 
>>  *  Refresh tokens must either be sender-constrained or one-time use
>>     as per Section 4.12.2 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
> 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01#section-12
> 
> I'm excited for the direction this is taking, and it has been a
> pleasure working with Dick and Torsten on this so far. My hope is that
> this first draft can serve as a good starting point for our future
> discussions!
> 
> ----
> Aaron Parecki
> aaronparecki.com
> @aaronpk
> 
> P.S. This notice was also posted at
> https://aaronparecki.com/2020/03/11/14/oauth-2-1
> 
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