Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00.txt

[Dave Tonge <[e-mail]>]

So although for this spec, request_uri is just an opaque string, it is
defined more generally in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-19#section-2.2 as an:

* Absolute URI from which the Request Object (Section 2.1) can be obtained*


And in section 5.2 as:


> *The "request_uri" value MUST be either URN as defined in*
> *   RFC8141 [RFC8141] or "https" URI, as defined in 2.7.2 of RFC7230*
> *   [RFC7230] .  The "request_uri" value MUST be reachable by the**
>  Authorization Server.*


So this is why in the spec we have example of a URN and we have an ongoing
discussion as to whether we should have a standard urn namespace that we
recommend implementers use.

In the interest of keeping the specs in sync I think it makes sense to keep
it a URN for this spec, but with more of an explanation as to why?

Dave

On Fri, 27 Sep 2019 at 19:22, Dick Hardt <[e-mail]> wrote:

> If I understand the proposal correctly, the request URI is opaque to the
> client. Correct?
>
> If so, why not just treat it as an opaque string?
>
> If I were implementing the protocol, I would have the blob be a signed
> token so that I could verify the integrity before making a database call.
> It much easier to throw compute at a DDOS attack to verify a signature,
> than DB capacity.
>
> ᐧ
>
> On Thu, Sep 26, 2019 at 2:24 PM Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>> Yes, the request object is JWT-based, but the request URI is not. In
>> other words, you can post a JWT but what you get back is a URI, not the JWT
>> itself.  The request URI was always meant to be a reference, and originally
>> it was explicitly a reference to a signed request object.
>>
>> — Justin
>>
>> On Sep 26, 2019, at 10:03 AM, Aaron Parecki <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> The URI is intended to be a reference not a value.. If the client could
>> send a JWT it would just send a request object instead of a request URI in
>> the first place. So the intent is that it’s random, and maybe we should
>> just say that explicitly.
>>
>>
>> I thought this language was explicitly to allow the use of structured
>> values for the request_uri? From the introduction:
>>
>> but it also allows clients requiring an even
>> higher security level, especially cryptographically confirmed non-
>> repudiation, to explicitly adopt JWT-based request objects.
>>
>>
>> ----
>> Aaron Parecki
>> aaronparecki.com
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 26, 2019 at 6:49 PM Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Aaron, some comments inline.
>>
>> — Justin
>>
>> On Sep 26, 2019, at 8:30 AM, Aaron Parecki <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Torsten,
>>
>> I'm very glad to see this draft, I think it's definitely needed in
>> this space. Here are some of my thoughts on the draft.
>>
>> "request_uri": "urn:example:bwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2"
>>
>>
>> Is it acceptable for the AS to return just an opaque string, rather
>> than something prefixed with "uri:*"? I don't think anyone would be
>> confused about copypasting the exact string from the "request_uri"
>> response into the "request_uri" parameter even if it didn't start with
>> "urn:". If, for whatever reason, it is required that this value is
>> actually a URI, is there some expected namespace to use other than
>> "example"? I worry that if all the examples in the spec are just
>> "urn:example:bwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2" then developers will end up
>> using the text "example" because they don't understand why it's there,
>> and then it serves no purpose really.’
>>
>>
>> This field must be a URI, as per JAR:
>>
>>   request_uri  The absolute URI as defined by RFC3986 [RFC3986] that
>>      points to the Request Object (Section 2.1) that holds
>>      authorization request parameters stated in section 4 of OAuth 2.0
>>      [RFC6749].
>>
>> Somewhat awkwardly, the JAR spec currently states that the AS has to do
>> an HTTP GET on the request URI, so that will need to be fixed in JAR before
>> it goes forward. I don’t think that was always the case though, and I’m not
>> sure how that changed.
>>
>> As for the namespace, “example” is ok for an example URN. The problem
>> with URNs is that nobody really understands how to do domain-safe fully
>> compliant URNs. So perhaps we should instead use “urn:fdc:example.com:….”
>> Instead (as per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4198)
>>
>>
>> The pushed authorization request endpoint shall be a RESTful API
>>
>>
>> I would drop the term RESTful and just say "HTTP API", as this
>> description is arguably RESTful at best.
>>
>> Depending on client type and authentication method, the request might
>> also include the "client_id" parameter.
>>
>>
>> I assume this is hinting at the difference between public clients
>> sending only the "client_id" parameter and confidential clients
>> sending only the HTTP Basic Authorization header which includes both
>> the client ID and secret? It would probably be helpful to call out
>> these two common examples if I am understanding this correctly,
>> otherwise it seems pretty vague.
>>
>>
>> Not quite, those differences are for the token endpoint, and this is
>> capturing things from the authorization endpoint. I don’t quite understand
>> the differentiation listed here either, though.
>>
>>
>> The "request_uri" value MUST be generated using a cryptographically
>> strong pseudorandom algorithm
>>
>>
>> I assume this includes the use of a random number inside of a JWT, in
>> case the AS wants to use JWTs as the "request_uri" parameter"? If so,
>> it's probably worth spelling that out as it kind of reads like it has
>> to be literally a random string at first glance.
>>
>>
>> The URI is intended to be a reference not a value. If the client could
>> send a JWT it would just send a request object instead of a request URI in
>> the first place. So the intent is that it’s random, and maybe we should
>> just say that explicitly.
>>
>>
>> That's all for now, thanks!
>>
>> ----
>> Aaron Parecki
>> aaronparecki.com
>> @aaronpk
>>
>> On Sat, Sep 21, 2019 at 1:02 PM Torsten Lodderstedt
>> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> I just published a new draft that Brian Campbell, Dave Tonge, Filip
>> Skokan, Nat Sakimura and I wrote.
>>
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00
>>
>> It proposes a new endpoint, called "pushed authorization request
>> endpoint”, that allows the client to push the Authorization Request payload
>> with the AS on a backchannel connection instead of a front channel
>> interaction. The AS provides the client with a request URI (according to
>> draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq) that the client uses in a subsequent authorization
>> requests to refer to the pushed request data.
>>
>> We believe this simple mechanism will significantly increase OAuth
>> security and robustness since any application can use it by just sending
>> the parameters in the same encoding as used at the authorisation endpoint
>> over a HTTPS-protected and (for confidential clients) mutually
>> authenticated connection to the AS. It can also be used to push signed and
>> encrypted request objects to the AS, i.e. it provides an interoperable way
>> to use request objects managed at the AS for use cases requiring an even
>> higher security level.
>>
>> We look forward to getting your feedback.
>>
>> kind regards,
>> Torsten.
>>
>> Begin forwarded message:
>>
>> From: [e-mail]
>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00.txt
>> Date: 21. September 2019 at 12:47:28 CEST
>> To: "Nat Sakimura" <[e-mail]>, "Brian Campbell" <
>> [e-mail]>, "Torsten Lodderstedt" <
>> [e-mail]>, "Dave Tonge" <[e-mail]>, "Filip Skokan" <
>> [e-mail]>
>>
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00.txt
>> has been successfully submitted by Torsten Lodderstedt and posted to the
>> IETF repository.
>>
>> Name: draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par
>> Revision: 00
>> Title: OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests
>> Document date: 2019-09-21
>> Group: Individual Submission
>> Pages: 12
>> URL:
>> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00.txt
>> Status:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par/
>> Htmlized:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00
>> <https://tools.ietf..org/html/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00>
>> Htmlized:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par
>>
>>
>> Abstract:
>> This document defines the pushed authorization request endpoint,
>> which allows clients to push the payload of an OAuth 2.0
>> authorization request to the authorization server via a direct
>> request and provides them with a request URI that is used as
>> reference to the data in a subsequent authorization request.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>> submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> The IETF Secretariat
>>
>>
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