Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto

While there are technical merits, both from security and performance
standpoints, to the alternative MAC proposals, there is not extensive
library support for those, and AFAIK they have little usage in the Internet.
I am not sure if it makes sense for OAuth to be on the leading edge in terms
of MAC algorithm adoption.

On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>wrote:

> Is there actual demand to make the HMAC method more generic to allow other
> kinds of MAC?
>
> EHL
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Manger, James H [mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com]
> > Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2009 7:43 PM
> > To: Eran Hammer-Lahav; Stephen Farrell
> > Cc: OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)
> > Subject: RE: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto
> >
> > >> Sounds reasonable if all you need to negotiate are hash algorithm
> names.
> > >> Is that the case?
> >
> > > Yes.
> >
> > Not quite.
> > OAuth (at least the authentication part) mainly needs a MAC algorithm,
> not a
> > hash algorithm.
> > HMAC is one popular MAC algorithm that is build from a hash algorithm.
> > However, there are other MAC algorithms — based on block ciphers for
> > instance (eg CMAC-AES).
> > The hash registry http://www.iana.org/assignments/hash-function-text-
> > names/ is not really going to help.
> >
> > P.S. The body-signing OAuth extension is the one place that uses a hash
> (not
> > a MAC) directly.
> >
> > James Manger
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>

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Breno de Medeiros