Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using the token endpoint

Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com> Mon, 07 January 2019 18:36 UTC

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From: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
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Date: Mon, 07 Jan 2019 18:36:29 +0000
Cc: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using the token endpoint
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Thinking about this, given that this is the *token* endpoint that clients talk to directly, not the *authorize* endpoint, it seems already possible for the AS to put it on a different port/host so that users aren’t ever prompted for a cert. Right?

— Neil

> On 7 Jan 2019, at 17:21, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
> 
> I don't honestly know for sure but I suspect that employees of big corporations will likely have keys/certs on their devices/machines that are issued by some internal CA and provisioned to them automatically (and in many cases without the user knowing and/or understanding that they are there and why). Those users would likely be prompted when TLS handshaking with a server that presents an empty list of CAs in the certificate_authorities of the CertificateRequest. 
> 
> I dunno. Maybe I was too quick to retract the proposal for the MTLS supporting secondary token endpoint?
> 
> What do folks (including Ben & Neil) think? 
> 
>> On Fri, Jan 4, 2019 at 2:55 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
>> On Fri, Dec 28, 2018 at 03:55:15PM -0700, Brian Campbell wrote:
>> > I
>> > suspect that not having client certs set up is the situation for the vast
>> > majority of users and their browsers. And for those that do have client
>> 
>> Is this still true when we limit to the set of users/browsers that are
>> employees of big corporations?
>> 
>> -Ben
>> 
>> > certs set up, I think they are more likely to be the kind of user that is
>> > able to deal with the UI prompt okay.
> 
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