Re: [OPSEC] [Tsv-art] game over, EH [Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-06]

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 06 December 2018 22:40 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 06 Dec 2018 14:40:00 -0800
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To: jared@puck.nether.net
Cc: Spencer Dawkins <spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com>, IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering.all@ietf.org, heard@pobox.com, opsec@ietf.org, tsv-art@ietf.org, gert@space.net
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Subject: Re: [OPSEC] [Tsv-art] game over, EH [Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-06]
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On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 11:24 AM Jared Mauch <jared@puck.nether.net> wrote:

>
>
> > On Dec 6, 2018, at 9:05 AM, Spencer Dawkins at IETF <
> spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Speaking as an individual who ballots on working group charters ...
> >
> > On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 7:38 AM Stewart Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 06/12/2018 12:57, Gert Doering wrote:
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > On Thu, Dec 06, 2018 at 10:28:53AM +0000, Stewart Bryant wrote:
> > >> However, aren't we moving to a world where new protocols get carried
> > >> over UDP anyway?
> > > Over HTTPS, you intended to say?
> > Some and some.  It depends on what aspect of the stack you spend your
> > time thinking about.
> >
> > "you're both right" :-) ...
> >
> > As noted earlier in this thread, we punted new transport protocols into
> UDP encapsulation at roughly the "we can't get SCTP deployed at scale, we
> can't get DCCP deployed at scale, and we don't see any reason to think that
> any new transport protocol will be any different" stage, at least a decade
> ago. So, when I see people talking about SCTP, it's usually in a context
> like RTCWeb, where the stack looks like SCTP/DTLS/UDP, and QUIC is only
> defined over UDP.
> >
> > (I suspect the world would have been a slightly better place if we'd
> done the DCCP encapsulation in UDP from day 1, because DCCP functionality
> could have been really useful when we started encapsulating every known
> network protocol in UDP, but that's not relevant to this discussion)
> >
> > But since QUIC's initial deliverable includes its HTTP mapping,
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-bcp56bis/ comes into
> play. I would oversimplify that draft as saying "we are way more excited
> about applications using HTTP as a substrate now, than we were in 2002",
> so, yes, the future smells a lot like HTTPS over (mumble) over UDP, at
> least to me.
> >
> > I don't know that's a perfect plan, but I've been balloting on working
> group charters for at least 3 years, assuming that it's a plan.
>
> Yes, we’ve also seen the security/crypto all the things overreach impact
> the routing area as well.  We’ve not seen a suitable option to replace TCP
> transport that is viable due to the timescales involved.  I’ve provided
> feedback at the mic in London in SAAG about the problems of this for people
> who need very reliable transport, some level of transport security but do
> not want or require transport privacy.
>

Jared,

I'm not entirely sure I know what you're talking about here. If I recall
your comments at the microphone correctly, they were about the challenges
with TCP-AO. However, I wouldn't really call TCP-AO an example of
security/crypto overreach. Rather, it was an attempt to fulfill what we
understood to be asks from the routing area (key agility, a stronger
algorithm than MD5). And of course TCP-AO doesn't attempt to provide
privacy. Perhaps you can elaborate on what you're referring to here?

-Ekr


> - Jared
>