Re: [OPSEC] draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requirements

[Joel Jaeggli <[e-mail]>]

Vishwas Manral wrote:
> Hi Joel,
> 
> Thanks for your comment on the document.
> 
>> We have the issue of vulnerable today vs problematic today, or
>> tomorrow... I feel very comfortable saying there are some places where
>> md5 is used today that I'd really prefer to not be using it in 5 years.
> If I understood you right, you are saying stating the fact that its
> used now though we would prefer it was not used. That was the exact
> idea of MUST-, SHOULD+ etc we had used in the document earlier.

I side with Sandra Murphy on the value of that particular language. If
my concern is that I should not be running something in the future I
want to simply state that. we take that concern expressed in an
informational document back to implementation.

> It gives an idea of direction of where the support of a particular
> algorithm is heading towards. However based on the comments in the
> list we modified the document to use standard IETF terminology.

Which I concur with.

joel

> Thanks,
> Vishwas
> 
>>> Thanks for your support of the document.
>>>
>>> There was no ambiguity as such, however Ran wanted us to look further
>>> into whether the recently announced vulnerabilities to SHA-1 and MD5
>>> would effect the reccomendation for HMAC-SHA-1.
>> We have the issue of vulnerable today vs problematic today, or
>> tomorrow... I feel very comfortable saying there are some places where
>> md5 is used today that I'd really prefer to not be using it in 5 years.
>>
>> That's good advice to have especially on the operational side.
>>
>> stating that is being proactice.
>>
>> joelja
>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Vishwas
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 9:04 AM, Glen Kent <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>> So was there any ambiguity in recommending HMAC-SHA1 over other
>>>> available options ever?
>>>>
>>>> I re-read the document, found it extremely simple, the recommendations
>>>> look right, found it just to be what OPSEC must own up.
>>>>
>>>> Glen
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 9:39 AM, Vishwas Manral <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>> Hi folks,
>>>>>
>>>>> We now have got some clear guidance regarding this document from the
>>>>> Security AD's regarding the cryptographic algorithms (Joel has been
>>>>> privy to those mails). The guidance seems to second what Hugo and
>>>>> other cryptographers have been stating all along. The crux of what has
>>>>> been said is:
>>>>>
>>>>> MD5 should not be used for crypto purposes. SHA-1 though stronger is
>>>>> also vulnerable. HMAC-MD5 though not yet vulnerable looks highly
>>>>> suspect and should not be reccomended. HMAC-SHA-1 for now looks ok and
>>>>> can be reccomended. Goinf forward we should try to reccomend the SHA-2
>>>>> family of protocols.
>>>>>
>>>>> With these clear guidances matching what we have in our documents, I
>>>>> would like to ask the working group to look into this document
>>>>> further. We can then look at getting this as a WG document.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>> Vishwas
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>