Re: [OPSEC] draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requirements

Hi Joel,

Thanks for your comment on the document.

> We have the issue of vulnerable today vs problematic today, or
> tomorrow... I feel very comfortable saying there are some places where
> md5 is used today that I'd really prefer to not be using it in 5 years.
If I understood you right, you are saying stating the fact that its
used now though we would prefer it was not used. That was the exact
idea of MUST-, SHOULD+ etc we had used in the document earlier.

It gives an idea of direction of where the support of a particular
algorithm is heading towards. However based on the comments in the
list we modified the document to use standard IETF terminology.

Thanks,
Vishwas

>> Thanks for your support of the document.
>>
>> There was no ambiguity as such, however Ran wanted us to look further
>> into whether the recently announced vulnerabilities to SHA-1 and MD5
>> would effect the reccomendation for HMAC-SHA-1.
>
> We have the issue of vulnerable today vs problematic today, or
> tomorrow... I feel very comfortable saying there are some places where
> md5 is used today that I'd really prefer to not be using it in 5 years.
>
> That's good advice to have especially on the operational side.
>
> stating that is being proactice.
>
> joelja
>
>> Thanks,
>> Vishwas
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 9:04 AM, Glen Kent <glen.kent@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> So was there any ambiguity in recommending HMAC-SHA1 over other
>>> available options ever?
>>>
>>> I re-read the document, found it extremely simple, the recommendations
>>> look right, found it just to be what OPSEC must own up.
>>>
>>> Glen
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 9:39 AM, Vishwas Manral <vishwas.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> Hi folks,
>>>>
>>>> We now have got some clear guidance regarding this document from the
>>>> Security AD's regarding the cryptographic algorithms (Joel has been
>>>> privy to those mails). The guidance seems to second what Hugo and
>>>> other cryptographers have been stating all along. The crux of what has
>>>> been said is:
>>>>
>>>> MD5 should not be used for crypto purposes. SHA-1 though stronger is
>>>> also vulnerable. HMAC-MD5 though not yet vulnerable looks highly
>>>> suspect and should not be reccomended. HMAC-SHA-1 for now looks ok and
>>>> can be reccomended. Goinf forward we should try to reccomend the SHA-2
>>>> family of protocols.
>>>>
>>>> With these clear guidances matching what we have in our documents, I
>>>> would like to ask the working group to look into this document
>>>> further. We can then look at getting this as a WG document.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Vishwas
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>
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