Re: [OPSEC] draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requirements

I concur with the idea that we should start moving towards HMAC-SHA as soon as it starts becoming available in the vendors data sheets. A recommendation from OPSEC will go a long way in making sure that folks start demanding this from their favorite vendors.

I also see that ISIS has recently posted an RFC describing how HMAC-SHA can be used; am sure, OSPF is not going to lag far behind. 

There are similar efforts underway in the TCPM WG to obsolete MD5 in favor of stronger algorithms.

Thanks, 
John

> -----Original Message-----
> From: opsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org] 
> On Behalf Of Vishwas Manral
> Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2009 11.50 PM
> To: Glen Kent
> Cc: opsec wg mailing list
> Subject: Re: [OPSEC] draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requirements
> 
> Hi Glen,
> 
> Thanks for your support of the document.
> 
> There was no ambiguity as such, however Ran wanted us to look further
> into whether the recently announced vulnerabilities to SHA-1 and MD5
> would effect the reccomendation for HMAC-SHA-1.
> 
> Thanks,
> Vishwas
> 
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 9:04 AM, Glen Kent 
> <glen.kent@gmail.com> wrote:
> > So was there any ambiguity in recommending HMAC-SHA1 over other
> > available options ever?
> >
> > I re-read the document, found it extremely simple, the 
> recommendations
> > look right, found it just to be what OPSEC must own up.
> >
> > Glen
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 9:39 AM, Vishwas Manral 
> <vishwas.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> Hi folks,
> >>
> >> We now have got some clear guidance regarding this 
> document from the
> >> Security AD's regarding the cryptographic algorithms (Joel has been
> >> privy to those mails). The guidance seems to second what Hugo and
> >> other cryptographers have been stating all along. The crux 
> of what has
> >> been said is:
> >>
> >> MD5 should not be used for crypto purposes. SHA-1 though 
> stronger is
> >> also vulnerable. HMAC-MD5 though not yet vulnerable looks highly
> >> suspect and should not be reccomended. HMAC-SHA-1 for now 
> looks ok and
> >> can be reccomended. Goinf forward we should try to 
> reccomend the SHA-2
> >> family of protocols.
> >>
> >> With these clear guidances matching what we have in our 
> documents, I
> >> would like to ask the working group to look into this document
> >> further. We can then look at getting this as a WG document.
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >> Vishwas
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OPSEC mailing list
> >> OPSEC@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
> >>
> >
> _______________________________________________
> OPSEC mailing list
> OPSEC@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>