Re: [OPSEC] draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requirements

So was there any ambiguity in recommending HMAC-SHA1 over other
available options ever?

I re-read the document, found it extremely simple, the recommendations
look right, found it just to be what OPSEC must own up.

Glen

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 9:39 AM, Vishwas Manral <vishwas.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi folks,
>
> We now have got some clear guidance regarding this document from the
> Security AD's regarding the cryptographic algorithms (Joel has been
> privy to those mails). The guidance seems to second what Hugo and
> other cryptographers have been stating all along. The crux of what has
> been said is:
>
> MD5 should not be used for crypto purposes. SHA-1 though stronger is
> also vulnerable. HMAC-MD5 though not yet vulnerable looks highly
> suspect and should not be reccomended. HMAC-SHA-1 for now looks ok and
> can be reccomended. Goinf forward we should try to reccomend the SHA-2
> family of protocols.
>
> With these clear guidances matching what we have in our documents, I
> would like to ask the working group to look into this document
> further. We can then look at getting this as a WG document.
>
> Thanks,
> Vishwas
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