Re: [OPSEC] draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requirements

Vishwas Manral <vishwas.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 24 February 2009 18:19 UTC

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Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 10:19:41 -0800
Message-ID: <77ead0ec0902241019n3342915q7777c7475b5bda5a@mail.gmail.com>
From: Vishwas Manral <vishwas.ietf@gmail.com>
To: Glen Kent <glen.kent@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OPSEC] draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requirements
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Hi Glen,

Thanks for your support of the document.

There was no ambiguity as such, however Ran wanted us to look further
into whether the recently announced vulnerabilities to SHA-1 and MD5
would effect the reccomendation for HMAC-SHA-1.

Thanks,
Vishwas

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 9:04 AM, Glen Kent <glen.kent@gmail.com> wrote:
> So was there any ambiguity in recommending HMAC-SHA1 over other
> available options ever?
>
> I re-read the document, found it extremely simple, the recommendations
> look right, found it just to be what OPSEC must own up.
>
> Glen
>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 9:39 AM, Vishwas Manral <vishwas.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Hi folks,
>>
>> We now have got some clear guidance regarding this document from the
>> Security AD's regarding the cryptographic algorithms (Joel has been
>> privy to those mails). The guidance seems to second what Hugo and
>> other cryptographers have been stating all along. The crux of what has
>> been said is:
>>
>> MD5 should not be used for crypto purposes. SHA-1 though stronger is
>> also vulnerable. HMAC-MD5 though not yet vulnerable looks highly
>> suspect and should not be reccomended. HMAC-SHA-1 for now looks ok and
>> can be reccomended. Goinf forward we should try to reccomend the SHA-2
>> family of protocols.
>>
>> With these clear guidances matching what we have in our documents, I
>> would like to ask the working group to look into this document
>> further. We can then look at getting this as a WG document.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Vishwas
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>