Re: [perpass] perpass: what next?
carlo von lynX <lynX@youfixtheinternet.psyced.org> Thu, 23 April 2015 13:31 UTC
Return-Path: <lynx@lo.psyced.org>
X-Original-To: perpass@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: perpass@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E0E5F1B3077 for <perpass@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 23 Apr 2015 06:31:15 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.011
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.011 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_40=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XMT0_elAKHRi for <perpass@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 23 Apr 2015 06:31:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from lo.psyced.org (lost.in.psyced.org [188.40.42.221]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A48D41B307F for <perpass@ietf.org>; Thu, 23 Apr 2015 06:31:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from lo.psyced.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by lo.psyced.org (8.14.3/8.14.3/Debian-9.4) with ESMTP id t3NDV9Lb003556 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO) for <perpass@ietf.org>; Thu, 23 Apr 2015 15:31:09 +0200
Received: (from lynx@localhost) by lo.psyced.org (8.14.3/8.14.3/Submit) id t3NDV9dq003555 for perpass@ietf.org; Thu, 23 Apr 2015 15:31:09 +0200
Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2015 15:31:09 +0200
From: carlo von lynX <lynX@youfixtheinternet.psyced.org>
To: perpass@ietf.org
Message-ID: <20150423133109.GA3190@lo.psyced.org>
References: <5530EEAB.5050601@cs.tcd.ie> <CACsn0cn7sY8MFCumUknXfqPWqELUtLdyh55Z=av-0NSbMb3xYw@mail.gmail.com> <CAFJuDmMT9rgjLx6JhBKa9NNiNCpFeYWMxB13TMYL+g2A0JjTOg@mail.gmail.com> <20150421165947.GA3690@lo.psyced.org> <5536B1E2.6070202@well.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <5536B1E2.6070202@well.com>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14)
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/perpass/9Inr1lZQDWxGmlYHA4xnCFcOJWg>
Subject: Re: [perpass] perpass: what next?
X-BeenThere: perpass@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: "The perpass list is for IETF discussion of pervasive monitoring. " <perpass.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/perpass>, <mailto:perpass-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/perpass/>
List-Post: <mailto:perpass@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:perpass-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass>, <mailto:perpass-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2015 13:31:16 -0000
On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 01:24:02PM -0700, Mike Liebhold wrote: > On 4/21/15 9:59 AM, carlo von lynX wrote: > >the first time I hear that some parts of the > >Internet already*have* the sort of architecture some research > >folks have been working on for over a decade now? Do you have > >*any* pointers about this? > > e.g. > - hidden services on TOR , and other onion networks > https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en Ehm okay, like everybody else too.. Tor is a bit half way there: - by not providing bidirectional authentication it favors client/server architectures even when routing by public key. where it bidirectional, doing e2e apps would be more easy. - by artificially trying to provide real-time performance Tor is unnecessarily easier to de-anonymize by traffic shaping. A fix called "alpha mixing" is however in the planning since 2006. - various other minor issues with the DHT etc to be fixed... > - Military MANETs Mobile Ad Hoc Networks e.g. > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-manet/ > > - Zeta Cartel wireless network, > http://www.wired.com/2012/11/zeta-radio/ heard of these, but didn't think they could be employed this way. will look into them. > - the blockchain...etc.. Bitmessage seems to perform better than I originally expected... because it does not use plain blockchain technology. Blockchain as such must theoretically run into scalability issues as popularity increases, according to my understanding of physics. -- E-mail is public! Talk to me in private using Tor. torify telnet loupsycedyglgamf.onion DON'T SEND ME irc://loupsycedyglgamf.onion:67/lynX PRIVATE EMAIL http://loupsycedyglgamf.onion/LynX/ OR FACEBOOGLE
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? John Levine
- [perpass] perpass: what next? Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Michael Richardson
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Mike Liebhold
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Watson Ladd
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Tim Bray
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Adam Caudill
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Paul Wouters
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? carlo von lynX
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Mike Liebhold
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Watson Ladd
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? carlo von lynX
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Joseph Lorenzo Hall
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Christian Huitema
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Stefan Winter
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Michael Richardson
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Ted Lemon
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Mike Liebhold
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Stefan Winter
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Stefan Winter
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] perpass: what next? Kathleen Moriarty