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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Threat model discussion does not cover handshake MITM (#3512)

MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com> Mon, 20 April 2020 08:40 UTC

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Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2020 01:39:18 -0700
From: MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Threat model discussion does not cover handshake MITM (#3512)
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Since this concerns the handshake, I'm not too confident in contributing text but I'd be happy to review and discuss.

I believe it is correct that the issue is covered in existing text elsewhere but as @erickinnear says, it makes sense to cover it in one place. The risk is that the reader is not aware how important it is to reach a certain point in the connection before trusting data, and especially to those seeking to create derived versions. From various discussions I'm not sure the importance is broadly understood.

Additionally, I'm not entirely convinced that the current text fully captures the problem - not the we necessarily can - for example various stateless transmissions / redirects / token issues - might assume a level of privacy that doesn't exist in all cases, thus requiring stronger integrity elsewhere such as in CIDs, tokens etc..



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