Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] The method of identifying "the same server" (#3155)

Kazuho Oku <> Mon, 28 October 2019 04:48 UTC

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Date: Sun, 27 Oct 2019 21:48:02 -0700
From: Kazuho Oku <>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] The method of identifying "the same server" (#3155)
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IIRC, @martinthomson pointed out that the scope of tokens should be as tight as that of the session tickets (i.e. option c), due to the following reason.

Consider the case of a split-server deployment (i.e. a gateway with a single IP address mapping connections to different QUIC servers in the backend, based on SNI). If we are to adopt option a or option b, one of those backend servers might issue a token, that would then be used by the client when connecting to a different backend server that shares the same gateway. This means that the party controlling the server that issued the token can see that the same client connected to a different server, assuming that the party can observe the traffic that goes into the load balancer.

To avoid the leak, the scope of NEW_TOKEN tokens should be at most the set of the server-names that the issuer of the token is authoritative for; which means option c.

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