Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add retry integrity tag (#3120)

Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com> Fri, 18 October 2019 08:16 UTC

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Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2019 01:15:57 -0700
From: Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add retry integrity tag (#3120)
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kazuho commented on this pull request.



> ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+|1|1| 3 | Unused|
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+|                         Version (32)                          |
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+| DCID Len (8)  |
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+|               Destination Connection ID (0..160)            ...
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+| SCID Len (8)  |
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+|                 Source Connection ID (0..160)               ...
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+|                        Retry Token (*)                      ...
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+| ODCID Len (8) |

We need the length, as if it's absent, an attacker on the path from client to server but not on the opposite direction can obtain an Initial carrying DCID=X, race an Initial carrying DCID=`prefix || X`. Assuming that the Retry in response to the spoofed Initial wins the race, the client would learn that the value of the token is `correct_token  || prefix`.

That said, I do not think having ODCID Len at this position prevents the attack, because the Retry Token field preceding this field does not have an explicit length. Rather, I think that we need to either place ODCID Len and ODCID before the Retry packet, or add the length of the Retry packet at the very front.

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