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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add retry integrity tag (#3120)

David Schinazi <notifications@github.com> Fri, 15 November 2019 10:08 UTC

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Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2019 02:08:12 -0800
From: David Schinazi <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add retry integrity tag (#3120)
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@ekr
1. encrypting the token has been discussed in this PR and does not have consensus
2. the zero key can be per-version (by which I mean that QUICv1 uses a zero key, and QUICv2 can decide to use a different key)

The discussion on this PR and related issue #3014 indicates that there is interest in the Retry Integrity Tag. On top of that, the PR as-is is currently covered by the chairs' latest consensus call. Therefore I'd suggest you please file a separate issue to discuss encrypting the token, and we can discuss that once this PR has landed. You can also file a second issue to discuss zero key vs non-zero.

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