IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add retry integrity tag (#3120)

MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com> Wed, 30 October 2019 21:56 UTC

Return-Path: <noreply@github.com>
X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA2A21200D6 for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 14:56:00 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.596
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.596 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_28=1.404, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id VJ1ypvwqsp_5 for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 14:55:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from out-21.smtp.github.com (out-21.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.204]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 205561200CC for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 14:55:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from github-lowworker-275fa97.va3-iad.github.net (github-lowworker-275fa97.va3-iad.github.net [10.48.17.64]) by smtp.github.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D84FA07DF for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 14:55:58 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1572472558; bh=kcGzUDtGJPfT6bZuwIz748vj7ujqo8iDH165GJpyMPw=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=KzcfVg+6f+seoqfPhrD6yaikg0LJv1hMvYPDKKrwjyelOrv5hsyisBnM/ZUlLkqse vSmDus4wdyuDk4S6CX8MAF/478/UTHpGO2CU4/YCu7gSSL0RnrxSgGI50i+mQkriNi L/se3mvq3eWTe7KBys2LcFvGBQjrF/9o81q3kAr4=
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 14:55:58 -0700
From: MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com>
Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts <reply+AFTOJK5WVRVROW3X6EBPZD53Y44W5EVBNHHB4UZE54@reply.github.com>
To: quicwg/base-drafts <base-drafts@noreply.github.com>
Cc: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>
Message-ID: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3120/c548129595@github.com>
In-Reply-To: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3120@github.com>
References: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3120@github.com>
Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add retry integrity tag (#3120)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5dba06ee5f89f_34683f84ccecd96c6031"; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: list
X-GitHub-Sender: mikkelfj
X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues
X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed
X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All
X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic-issues/XG8gsSrTHw_Auc1BXwGNBY0FJWU>
X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG <quic-issues.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic-issues/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic-issues@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 21:56:01 -0000

@DavidSchinazi on AES-GCM that is not correct: The crypto part yes, but you do not encrypt you only GHASH because it is AEAD only. GHASH is a 128-bit carryless multiplication over a Galois Field which completes the checksum. If you CLMUL instructions this is efficient, otherwise not so much. That is where Poly1305 is a gain. CLMUL is not very common on misc. controllers even if they have other accelerations, at least for the time being. E.g. ESP8266.

I agree that AES-GCM is the right choice given the circumstances but I think Poly1305 would be better for initial and retry because it would work in a broader range. The benefit of AES-GCM is that highly loaded servers will have the necessary accelleration and may slow down on AES-GCM - even if this is a tiny fraction of the overall connection cost, it may be important as it fends of noise from the broader internet.

-- 
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3120#issuecomment-548129595

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email