Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Updated ICMP PMTU section (#1412)

[MikkelFJ <[e-mail]>]

mikkelfj commented on this pull request.



>  
-As a result, endpoints that implement PMTUD in IPv4 SHOULD take steps to
-mitigate this risk. For instance, an application could:
+The minimum required validation of ICMP messages with an on-path proof invoves
+verifying that the message was sent by this endpoint with at least 1-2^32
+probability and it is still outstanding (not acknowledged and not deemed lost).
+If a QUIC endpoint does not perform this minimum validation, it SHOULD treat the
+packet as an ICMP message without an on-path proof.
+
+As noted in {{?RFC5927}}, using ICMP messages without an on-path proof exposes
+the protocol implementation to off-path attacks and requires mitigations.
+
+Even ICMP messages without an on-path proof SHOULD undergo some validation, such
+as:
 
 * Set the IPv4 Don't Fragment (DF) bit on a small proportion of packets, so that

I also wondered ...

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