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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Disconnect with Initial Injection (#1951)

Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com> Fri, 30 November 2018 02:13 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Disconnect with Initial Injection (#1951)
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FWIW, I am starting to wonder if there could be an alternative approach than dropping Initial keys.

Specifically, I am wondering if just having the rules for dealing with potentially attacking frames (instead of packets) would be either equivalent to (or even better than) trying to drop the keys.

To me it seems that declaring the following three rules (quoted from https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/2053#discussion_r237723449) is sufficient, or even better considering invalid ACK injection attacks during the exchange of Initial packets. The other benefit is that the loss recovery / congestion control logic can remain unchanged.

> How about stating that, for Initial packets:
>
> * an endpoint MUST ignore CRYPTO frames once it obtains Handshake keys
> * an endpoint MUST ignore CONNECTION_CLOSE frames once it receives a Handshake packet
> * an endpoint MUST ignore unexpected packet numbers found in an ACK frame


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