Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Can a server use a Handshake packet for ACK of the last client Handshake packet (#829)

Mike Bishop <notifications@github.com> Wed, 14 March 2018 14:12 UTC

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Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 14:12:46 +0000
From: Mike Bishop <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Can a server use a Handshake packet for ACK of the last client Handshake packet (#829)
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Per editors' meeting:  Not only can a server do this, it MUST.  Packets encrypted with the handshake key MUST be acknowledged only in packets encrypted with the handshake key.  Packets encrypted with 0-RTT or 1-RTT keys MUST be acknowledged only in a packet encrypted with the 1-RTT key.  (There might be alternative solutions, and those would be welcome.)

The reason for this is a man-on-the-side attack in which an attacker injects a cleartext packet with the same packet number as a forthcoming 1-RTT packet, causing disagreement between the peers about whether subsequent packets were actually received.  This causes data loss after the handshake is complete by leaving a hole in the received data stream.

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