Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, post-Cupertino
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Sun, 27 October 2019 23:02 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sun, 27 Oct 2019 16:01:43 -0700
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Subject: Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, post-Cupertino
To: Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com>
Cc: Jana Iyengar <jri.ietf@gmail.com>, Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be>, David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com>, IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>, Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
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I think we're clearly going to need to spend some time on this. I don't think the spec is satisfactory as-is: we should be designing a transport that works for all use cases, not just H3. That said, I also don't agree that we need an additional explicit signal. We have one, it's called "ACK". We should figure out how to make that work. -Ekr On Fri, Oct 25, 2019 at 9:36 AM Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com> wrote: > I agree with the dissenters. The current spec works in the HTTP3 use case, > though I think we should fix it. Keeping keys forever is unsatisfactory for > several reasons. We should use an explicit signal, and there is no reason > to kick the can down the road. Let's just leave #2863 open till we resolve > it. > > On Wed, Oct 23, 2019 at 7:40 PM Jana Iyengar <jri.ietf@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Yup. We need to get this over with in the dumbest way possible. >> >> On Thu, Oct 24, 2019 at 3:53 AM Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be> wrote: >> >>> I think we’ve amply demonstrated that implicit signals don’t work. I’d >>> like to see an explicit confirmation of handshake completion that happens >>> at 1-RTT. >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* QUIC <quic-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of * David Schinazi >>> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 22, 2019 4:07 PM >>> *To:* Jana Iyengar <jri.ietf@gmail.com> >>> *Cc:* Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com>; IETF QUIC WG < >>> quic@ietf.org>; Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>; Kazuho Oku < >>> kazuhooku@gmail.com> >>> *Subject:* Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, post-Cupertino >>> >>> >>> >>> +1 >>> >>> >>> >>> I think the text we have in the spec today is better than the proposal >>> to never discard the handshake keys. >>> >>> My preference would be to spend the time to fix the issue, and not add a >>> temporary workaround for now. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 12:51 AM Jana Iyengar <jri.ietf@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> I agree with Kazuho here. The issue of migration was not one we had >>> considered. I was going through this with Kazuho, and we may have >>> identified yet another issue with handshake retransmissions and migration, >>> which is present in the current spec. >>> >>> >>> >>> Sadly, I don't think we can call this issue done... >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 2:14 PM Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen < >>> mikkelfj@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Without a way to move to a single PN space I find this a deal breaker. I >>> might do a custom version of the protocol. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> >>> *Fra:* QUIC <quic-bounces@ietf.org> på vegne af Kazuho Oku < >>> kazuhooku@gmail.com> >>> *Sendt:* tirsdag, oktober 22, 2019 6:58 AM >>> *Til:* Martin Thomson >>> *Cc:* IETF QUIC WG >>> *Emne:* Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, post-Cupertino >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> 2019年10月22日(火) 11:38 Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>: >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 22, 2019, at 12:39, Nick Banks wrote: >>> > I'd also prefer to fix the problem, even if it means bringing back >>> > something like RETIRE_KEY. >>> >>> I would prefer to think of this proposed resolution as a temporary one. >>> I don't think that we agreed to keep the handshake keys indefinitely, only >>> that we would use that option as a fallback position until we found a >>> better solution. >>> >>> >>> >>> I might point out that #3121 is not proposal-ready as a way to resolve >>> #2863. That is because it does not define how to send and receive Handshake >>> packets until or after migration happens. There would be a deadlock unless >>> both endpoints agree on how that should be done (e.g., how to select SCID, >>> whether the path used for Handshake packets migrates too). >>> >>> >>> >>> Without that being clarified, can we say that we are ready for a >>> consensus call? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On that basis, I think that it would be best if we open a new issue that >>> says "Handshake keys can't ever be dropped". >>> >>> We might still conclude not to address that issue, but the important >>> thing is to ensure that any solution works properly. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Kazuho Oku >>> >>>
- Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, post-Cu… Mark Nottingham
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Nick Banks
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Martin Thomson
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… David Schinazi
- RE: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Mike Bishop
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Martin Duke
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Martin Thomson
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Martin Thomson
- RE: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Mike Bishop
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Martin Thomson
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Martin Thomson
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Watson Ladd
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Martin Thomson
- RE: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Mike Bishop
- RE: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Martin Thomson
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Christian Huitema
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Martin Thomson
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Christian Huitema
- Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pos… Mark Nottingham