RE: Request for Authenticated but not Encrypted Traffic

["Randy Armstrong (OPC)" <[e-mail]>]

The requirement is that factory owners need to use tools to monitor network traffic to detect anomalies.

From: Eliot Lear <[e-mail]>
Sent: Friday, September 30, 2022 5:44 PM
To: Randy Armstrong (OPC) <[e-mail]>; Phillip Hallam-Baker <[e-mail]>
Cc: [e-mail]
Subject: Re: Request for Authenticated but not Encrypted Traffic


Randy,

I'm not discussing backdoors, but requirements.  State your requirements.

Eliot
On 30.09.22 10:38, Randy Armstrong (OPC) wrote:

  1.  I think the key point here is that sometimes observability is a feature and not a bug.  This is particularly important in industrial/critical infrastructure.  That observability can be achieved in many ways.  One question is whether the observability itself should itself be authorized.

Putting backdoors into protocols is not equivalent to letting applications decide to skip encryption.

A backdoor is like giving law enforcement codes to break into a cellphone and hoping that they will never abuse the power or the codes will never fall into the hands of criminals. Letting applications decide is equivalent to an owner of a cellphone choosing not to lock their screen because they decide there is nothing that needs protecting.

IOW, the fact that some users might be willing to live with the risk of a compromised system by allowing for backdoors is not a reason to refuse to allow other users to make a decision send data in clear text when and only when they decide it is safe.