Re: Request for Authenticated but not Encrypted Traffic

[Phillip Hallam-Baker <[e-mail]>]

I see a requirement here being presented as an implementation.

The requirement is the ability of an authorized party within the network to
observe network traffic for debugging purposes. That is a very normal
requirement in process control. Process control networks are typically run
in a fashion that most IETF-ers would find unusual. The networks are
typically very quiet with absolutely no extraneous traffic. The traffic is
typically unencrypted so that systems can be monitored continuously.

The overriding objective is to protect integrity and availability.
Confidentiality is not (typically) considered a concern. The problem being
that a lot of systems depend on confidentiality of certain data to provide
for integrity. Particularly to protect against replay attacks. So I don't
think turning off encryption entirely is the right move.

A better approach for this particular requirement is to have a mechanism
which uses encryption but explicitly provides the necessary observer
decryption capabilities. But that approach has been repeatedly rejected in
IETF.



On Thu, Sep 29, 2022 at 8:31 AM Randy Armstrong (OPC) <
[e-mail]> wrote:

> The OPC Foundation is looking at deploying QUIC within factories as means
> for different OT devices to communicate with each other. In this
> environment, factory owners often wish to monitor traffic to check for
> anomalies. Encryption prevents this.
>
>
>
> For this reason, an authentication only option is essential to making QUIC
> a viable choice for communication within factories.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
>
> Randy Armstrong
>
> OPC UA Security WG Chair
>
>