Re: Request for Authenticated but not Encrypted Traffic

[Eliot Lear <[e-mail]>]

On 30.09.22 05:56, Randy Armstrong (OPC) wrote:
>
>   * A better approach for this particular requirement is to have a
>     mechanism which uses encryption but explicitly provides the
>     necessary observer decryption capabilities. But that approach has
>     been repeatedly rejected in IETF.
>
> I feel that putting backdoors into encryption protocols is a recipe 
> for disaster. Encryption, once applied, should not be breakable or 
> vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. Applications should make the 
> choice based on the tasks they need to do when a connection is 
> established and have access to APIs that clearly tell them that they 
> are using an unencrypted communication channel.
>
I think the key point here is that sometimes observability is a feature 
and not a bug.  This is particularly important in industrial/critical 
infrastructure.  That observability can be achieved in many ways.  One 
question is whether the observability itself should itself be authorized.

Eliot