[Rats] 答复: use case document updates on Roots of Trust

"Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)" <frank.xialiang@huawei.com> Tue, 17 September 2019 00:51 UTC

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From: "Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)" <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
To: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>, Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
CC: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2019 00:51:33 +0000
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References: <4155.1567948986@dooku.sandelman.ca> <64BD12AA-951A-468A-9F08-D442054605AD@island-resort.com> <de6ff852-062d-805d-3eed-10aca60502b2@sit.fraunhofer.de> <CAN40gStH5jUCJeVggREr3ABoFw7K97F=KtoJOSR_X+LWNLB+JA@mail.gmail.com> <CAN40gSu13DKkyahHA3_Cbt5j7Gsh=uGh5ic7fS3AvDGP3K1cug@mail.gmail.com> <5276.1568315351@dooku.sandelman.ca> <92137679-7DEA-42AD-B8D1-F3B909C77459@akamai.com> <BAA4C3C3-C98B-4BA7-8C89-A169DD99EF86@island-resort.com> <D9A4F66D.EB1C1%carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
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Subject: [Rats] 答复: use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Hi Carl,
The other big difference between them is the object they deal with: RoT is for integrity measurement value chain, CA is for certificate chain.

Hope it is helpful.

B.R.
Frank

-----邮件原件-----
发件人: RATS [mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org] 代表 Carl Wallace
发送时间: 2019年9月16日 20:26
收件人: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>; Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com>
抄送: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>; rats@ietf.org
主题: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust

I took Rich's statement to be more from a relying party perspective and your detail to be more what one might find in a policy describing nature of the root of trust, which is not that different from how one may describe a trust anchor/CA in a PKIX context in a policy that describes how a CA are operated, etc. Two sides of the same coin.

On 9/15/19, 4:50 PM, "RATS on behalf of Laurence Lundblade"
<rats-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of lgl@island-resort.com> wrote:

>On Sep 12, 2019, at 3:31 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>> 
>> I do not see a meaningful difference between "trust anchor" and 
>>"trust root" and "root(s) of trust."  All of them:
>> 	- Are pieces of data (certificate or key is not meaningful)
>> 	- Used to verify something such as a certificate or signature
>> 	- Are trusted by the application, based on actions that are "out of 
>>band" of the application itself
>
>This is not how I understand a root of trust, nor how I think it is 
>generally used in the TCG or TEE worlds. I think a root of trust 
>involves a CPU, memory and SW that actively does something like boot 
>and measure a device. There is usually a boundary around it so that 
>other software on the device, like the high-level OS, can’t corrupt it. 
>When it is doing reporting as in RATS it will have a private key that can do some signing.
>When it is doing trusted/secure boot, it will also have a public key to 
>verify the software it loads.
>
>LL
>
>
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