Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Thu, 12 September 2019 22:18 UTC

Return-Path: <mcr@sandelman.ca>
X-Original-To: rats@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: rats@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7447A1201C6 for <rats@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 12 Sep 2019 15:18:18 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.307
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.307 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DATE_IN_PAST_03_06=1.592, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id M6meExePpB9k for <rats@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 12 Sep 2019 15:18:17 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from relay.sandelman.ca (relay.cooperix.net [176.58.120.209]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 14EAF1200A4 for <rats@ietf.org>; Thu, 12 Sep 2019 15:18:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from dooku.sandelman.ca (unknown [109.69.229.85]) by relay.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 458001F482 for <rats@ietf.org>; Thu, 12 Sep 2019 22:18:15 +0000 (UTC)
Received: by dooku.sandelman.ca (Postfix, from userid 179) id 2EA0349EF; Thu, 12 Sep 2019 20:09:11 +0100 (WEST)
From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: rats@ietf.org
In-reply-to: <CAN40gSu13DKkyahHA3_Cbt5j7Gsh=uGh5ic7fS3AvDGP3K1cug@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4155.1567948986@dooku.sandelman.ca> <64BD12AA-951A-468A-9F08-D442054605AD@island-resort.com> <de6ff852-062d-805d-3eed-10aca60502b2@sit.fraunhofer.de> <CAN40gStH5jUCJeVggREr3ABoFw7K97F=KtoJOSR_X+LWNLB+JA@mail.gmail.com> <CAN40gSu13DKkyahHA3_Cbt5j7Gsh=uGh5ic7fS3AvDGP3K1cug@mail.gmail.com>
Comments: In-reply-to Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com> message dated "Mon, 09 Sep 2019 19:40:00 -0400."
X-Mailer: MH-E 8.6; nmh 1.6; GNU Emacs 24.5.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg="pgp-sha256"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 20:09:11 +0100
Message-ID: <5276.1568315351@dooku.sandelman.ca>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/o4X1uDS9MVDtqDOBtXhVBYraD0k>
Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
X-BeenThere: rats@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Remote Attestation Procedures <rats.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/rats>, <mailto:rats-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/>
List-Post: <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:rats-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats>, <mailto:rats-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 22:18:18 -0000

Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com> wrote:
    > If the term RoT continues to cause heartburn in RATS, then we might
    > just use the generic "Trust Anchor" which is widely used to encompass
    > both hardware and software RoTs in a number of SDOs.

No, that's exactly what I don't want to do!

A trust anchor is a thing you have in your system (such as your browser),
that let's you validate other certificates.  While in abstract concept it
shares many properties with a RoT, it's a very different thing to people
who don't live and breath attestation.

A reason I don't like the term RoT (not the definition, btw), is because in
some languages the order of the words doesn't matter.  So a Trusted Root
(Certificate), might be easily confused with a Root of Trust!
{It's taken me six months to get this into my head right, and at the Linux
Plumber's Conference, I watched several others fail to deal with the issue}

As I understand it, the RoT is the component which is forced measure itself,
because there exists no other component.  The trust is "Immaculate".
If I could replace RoT with another term, I'd use "Birth of Trust" or
"Immaculate Trust" or something like that.

I'M NOT PROPOSING TO CHANGE THE TERM.
I'm just airing dirty laundry, to explain that we need to be clearer about
this somewhere.


The only reason the use case document cares, is because I think it is
important for the use cases to be clear if they require the Third Party
Attestation of the RoT Claim in order to operate.

Some use cases do not, as their dependancy is upon a higher level
attestation, or the device has been attested to use Secure Boot 
rather than Trusted Boot.

-- 
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-