Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust

Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com> Sun, 15 September 2019 20:50 UTC

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From: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
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Date: Sun, 15 Sep 2019 13:50:15 -0700
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Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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On Sep 12, 2019, at 3:31 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> 
> I do not see a meaningful difference between "trust anchor" and "trust root" and "root(s) of trust."  All of them:
> 	- Are pieces of data (certificate or key is not meaningful)
> 	- Used to verify something such as a certificate or signature
> 	- Are trusted by the application, based on actions that are "out of band" of the application itself

This is not how I understand a root of trust, nor how I think it is generally used in the TCG or TEE worlds. I think a root of trust involves a CPU, memory and SW that actively does something like boot and measure a device. There is usually a boundary around it so that other software on the device, like the high-level OS, can’t corrupt it. When it is doing reporting as in RATS it will have a private key that can do some signing. When it is doing trusted/secure boot, it will also have a public key to verify the software it loads.

LL