Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust

[Carl Wallace <[e-mail]>]

I took Rich's statement to be more from a relying party perspective and
your detail to be more what one might find in a policy describing nature
of the root of trust, which is not that different from how one may
describe a trust anchor/CA in a PKIX context in a policy that describes
how a CA are operated, etc. Two sides of the same coin.

On 9/15/19, 4:50 PM, "RATS on behalf of Laurence Lundblade"
<[e-mail] on behalf of [e-mail]> wrote:

>On Sep 12, 2019, at 3:31 PM, Salz, Rich <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>> I do not see a meaningful difference between "trust anchor" and "trust
>>root" and "root(s) of trust."  All of them:
>> 	- Are pieces of data (certificate or key is not meaningful)
>> 	- Used to verify something such as a certificate or signature
>> 	- Are trusted by the application, based on actions that are "out of
>>band" of the application itself
>
>This is not how I understand a root of trust, nor how I think it is
>generally used in the TCG or TEE worlds. I think a root of trust involves
>a CPU, memory and SW that actively does something like boot and measure a
>device. There is usually a boundary around it so that other software on
>the device, like the high-level OS, can’t corrupt it. When it is doing
>reporting as in RATS it will have a private key that can do some signing.
>When it is doing trusted/secure boot, it will also have a public key to
>verify the software it loads.
>
>LL
>
>
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